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Introduction
Reasoningin a complex anddynamic worldrequires consid-
erableﬂexibility on the partof the reasoner;ﬂexibility to ap-
ply, in the right circumstances, the right tools (e.g. probabil-
ities, defaults, metareasoning, belief revision, contradiction-
resolution, and so on). A formalismthat has beendeveloped
withthis purposein mindis that ofactive logic. Active logic
combinesinferenceruleswithaconstantlyevolvingmeasure
of time (a ‘now’) that itself can be referenced in those rules.
As an example,
￿
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￿
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￿
￿
￿ [the time is now 6]is inferred from
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ sincethefact ofsuch inferenceimpliesthat (atleast
one ‘step’ of) time has passed.
From this feature come others, most notably:
￿ Ignorance-assessment amounts to a lookup at time
￿ , of
what was known prior to
￿ .
￿ Contradictory information can (sometimes) be detected
andusedto curtailnonsensicalinferencesaswellasto ini-
tiate repairs.
￿ Default conclusions can be characterized in terms of
lookupstoseewhetheronehasinformation(directly)con-
trary to the default.
￿ Reasoningcanbe kept current, i.e., inferences canbe trig-
gered to occur when they should, and this itself is done
declarativelysothatitisalsoundercontrolof(easilymod-
iﬁable) inferences.
These featuresofactive logic provide mechanismsto deal
with various forms of uncertainties arising in computation.
A computational process P can be said to be uncertain
about a proposition (or datum)
￿ if
(i). it explicitly represents
￿ as in the knowledge base (KB)
but possibly a mistake;
(ii). it represents
￿ as in the KB and initially correct but pos-
sibly no longer correct;
(iii). itisawareof
￿ (and/or
￿
￿
￿ )–thatis,
￿ isaclosedsubfor-
mula of at least one item in the KB – but
￿ is not present
in the KB as a belief; or
(iv).
￿ isknown tobe anitemit cannotcompute orinfer. (This
last case is often undecidable in its fullest form; active
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logic provides a convenientshortcut that we will return to
below.)
Uncertainties of type (i) above lend themselves to repre-
sentation by probabilisticreasoning, which involvesthe rep-
resentation of explicit conﬁdence levels for beliefs, for ex-
ample, Bayesian Networks; and somewhat less so for type
(ii); and even less for types (iii) and (iv). On the other
hand, a suitablyconﬁgureddefaultreasoner (non-monotonic
approaches) can represent all of these, and without special
ad hoc tools; that is, active logic already has, in its time-
sensitive inference architecture, the means for performing
default reasoning in an appropriately expressive manner. It
is the purpose of this paper to elaborate on that claim; the
format consists of an initial primer on uncertainty in active
logic, then its current implementation (Alma/Carne), exist-
ing applications, and ﬁnally a discussion of potential future
applications.
Probabilistic and Non-monotonic Reasoning
Probabilistic approaches (Pearl 1988;
Ramoni & Riva 1994) are very useful in reasoning with un-
certainty; they can smoothly handle inconsistent inputs, and
model belief change over time as evidence accrues, by ad-
justing theprobabilities attached to beliefs and their connec-
tions. However, in a Bayesian net for instance, because the
probabilities have a somewhat holistic character, with the
probability of a given proposition depending not just on di-
rect butindirectconnections, itlookslike addingnewpropo-
sitions or rules (connections between nodes) will be expen-
sive and potentially require re-calculation of all connection
weights. If one’s world-model is well speciﬁed enough that
reasoning about and interacting with the world is primarily
a matter of coming to trust or distrust propositions already
presentin thatmodel, a Bayesiannetmayprovidea gooden-
gine for reasoning. However, if one’s world-model is itself
expected to be subject to frequent change, as novel propo-
sitions and rules are added (or removed) from one’s KB, we
thinkthat areasoningenginebasedonactivelogicwillprove
a better candidate.
In addition, and partly because a Bayesian net deals so
smoothly with inconsistent incoming data, it can operate on
the assumption that incoming data is accurate and can be
taken at face value. Although of course it is not expectedthat all incoming data will be accurate (for instance, it is ex-
pected
￿ to contain noise), it is expected that the system will
get reliable inputs overall. We have two related concerns
about this: ﬁrst, an abnormallylongstring ofinaccurate data
– as might be expected from a faulty sensor or a deliberate
attempt at deceit – would obviously reduce the probability
of certain beliefs that, were the data known to be inaccurate,
wouldhaveretained theiroriginal strengths. It has beensug-
gested to us that onecould model inaccurateincoming infor-
mationbycodingchildnodesthatwouldcontaininformation
regardingtheexpectedaccuracyoftheincominginformation
from a given evidence node. This seems adequate when it is
known at the outset that a given sensor operates with a cer-
tain reliability; but it is not clear how one might learn that
an information source is unreliable, as one might wish to be
able to do if a sensor breaks or a source begins lying. Sec-
ond, it seems that in a Bayesian net, all beliefs are similarly
sensitive to incoming data (if they aresensitive to it at all) in
thesense that thenetoperatesby a slowerosionorconﬁrma-
tion of probability. But it is not clear that all beliefs should
ﬁt this model; one can retain full conﬁdence in a given be-
lief for a long time in the face of continuing empirical ev-
idence to the contrary, and then in light of a single further
fact (which alone would not have caused this event) give up
the belief entirely. (See (Bratman 1999) for a discussion of
belief modeling in light of such considerations.)
Further, insofar as a Bayesian net is operating smoothly,
the fact that incoming data contradicts currently held be-
liefs, or other incoming data, need not be explicitly recog-
nized. But we believe that the recognition of contradiction
should be a central and important part of information han-
dling (Perlis 1997). For it seems that there are cases where
one can learn from the fact of a contradiction (where the be-
lief that there has been a contradiction can be useful in the
reasoning process), as for instance in coming to the conclu-
sion that there is a system malfunction. Although it is no
doubt possible to modify a Bayesian net to explicitly encode
theoccurrenceofa contradiction,itislessclearwhatuse this
informationwouldbe withinthat schema. Andthisbringsus
to ourﬁnalreasonforpreferring non-monotonicapproaches:
active logic has much greater expressive power, including
not just the ability to encode complex propositions, but also
functions and quantiﬁcation.
Let us consider the fol-
lowing example: The belief
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weakened by indirect evidence, e.g.
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￿ . Insuchcaseone willat
least wantto considerhis reaction to a photographof a green
Tweety. The complexity of the case is not captured by de-
cidinghow to treatthe veridicalityof photographsin general
(for assigningalowerprobabilitytothis sortofevidencejust
means it willtake longerfor photographiccontentto register
in the KB, and this will not always be appropriate); the is-
sue is one of coming to an intelligent assessment of a given
piece of evidence (photograph or no) in light of current be-
liefs and their parents (if any – without theoretical consider-
ations supporting a given belief we may adopt the new evi-
dence at face value; with very strongempirical evidence, we
might disbelieve the theoretical bases.) It looks as though in
many caseswe willwanttomake decisionsabout this, rather
thanletting thingsplayout accordingtopre-determinedcon-
ﬁdence measures. On the other hand, it seems important
that we recognize and remember the (apparent) contradic-
tion, evenwhenwe resolveit by distrustingthephotographs.
For a system which is fully epistemically open to the world
– that is, which is capable of changing its world model by
adding or deleting rules and facts, and for which every be-
lief in the world model is empiricallysensitive (no dogmatic
beliefs) – may encounter evidence that directly contradicts
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￿ . In such case, among the considera-
tions motivating a decision to accept the new evidence may
be the fact that it allows acceptance of the previously dis-
carded photographic evidence of Tweety’s greenness.
Primer on Active Logic and Uncertainty
Currently, active logic does not explicitly represent conﬁ-
dence levels of the KB (although it certainly can be made to
do so). Instead, it has the ﬂexibility to distrust any of its be-
liefs in the presence of suitable counter evidence. In effect,
active logic treats its current beliefs assimply true until such
time as reasons arise for doubting them, and then distrusts
them until such timeasthey maybe reinstated. Onecan thus
regard (the current versionof) active logic as a kind of time-
sensitive nonmonotonic reasoning engine.
Two of the principal mechanisms that provide the ﬂexi-
bility of active logic, especially in regard to uncertainty, are
contradiction-detection and introspection.
Contradiction-detection: If
@ and
￿
A
@ arebothintheKB
atanystep, thenbothbecomedistrustedinthenextstepanda
repair process is initiated (which may or may not be conclu-
sive). Such a distrust and repair process can occur in cases
(i) and (ii). For instance, if
@ is believed originally,but later
￿
B
@ is either derived or observed (this could come about for
variousreasons:
@ mightalwayshavebeenfalse,andthebe-
lief that
@ mistaken;
@ might have become false;
￿
A
@ could
be false, and this new belief could therefore be a mistake),
then a conﬂict occursbetween
@ and
￿
A
@ . This would cause
activelogicto enterastateof“uncertainty”withrespectto
@
and
￿
A
@ leading to distrust both
@ and
￿
B
@ and to initiate a
repair process to adjudicate between the ‘old’
@ and ‘new’
￿
B
@ . (Unlike most belief-revision formalisms, active logic
does not automatically assume that the newest data is more
accurate). The repair process involves the identiﬁcation and
distrustof the parents (andany derived consequences)ofthe
contradictands; reasoningabout the parents;and possible re-
instatementofoneoranothersetofparents,whichmayallow
one of the original contradictands to be re-derived.
Returning to our
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￿ example, in the nor-
mal case such a belief would be taken (and used) simply
at face value, even though it may (unknown to the rea-
soner) be incorrect, until such time as counterevidence ap-
pears (the photo showing a green Tweety). At that time,
a contradiction would occur between
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rulesabout howcolorsinhereinobjects). Assessmentwould
discover and distrust the parents of each contradictand, and
attempt to discern which beliefs it ought to reinstate, as forinstance by utilizing preferences for some beliefs over oth-
ers (the
I whole set need not be acceptedor rejected together).
Thus, assessment may lead to rejection of the initial belief;
or it may lead to its reinstatement, and rejection of the photo
data (not just if it had a preference for the theoretical bases
of
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￿ , but also, for instance, if it knew that the
photo was developed poorly, or taken in green light). (This
insteadofassumingconﬁdencesforvariousofthedata items
and combining them into a revised conﬁdence measure for
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Introspection: Another mechanism that provides the
ﬂexibility of active logic is its ability to note that it does
not have a given belief
@ , represented as
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￿ . This ability can be applied to encode uncer-
tainties in uncertainties of type (iii) above. Here it is crucial
that
O
9
P
￿
Q
￿
R is interpreted as “currently-in-the-KB”, and not
as (an often undecidable) “possible-to-derive.” Thus an in-
tractable or even uncomputable problem is replaced with a
simple lookupin the(always ﬁnite) KB. In the above yellow
bird example, this can be used as part of a default, to wit: “if
something looks yellow and if I (currently) have no knowl-
edge that there is an irregularity about the situation, then I
will conclude that it in fact is yellow.”
S Later, if the conclu-
sion that Tweety is yellow is found to be problematic (e.g.,
it conﬂicts with other data) that conclusion can be retracted
(or precisely, disinheritedat subsequent time steps, since the
actual inferential history is preserved).
Alma/Carne
AlmaisourcurrentimplementationofactivelogicandCarne
isa processthat executes non-logicalcomputations indepen-
dent of Alma steps.
Alma: At each step, Alma applies the rules of inference
to theformulas in thedatabase atthat step to producea set of
new formulas. These are added to the database, and the pro-
cess repeatsateach subsequentstep. Somecharacteristicsof
Alma are:
￿ The current step number is represented in the KB as
P
￿
Q
￿
R
T
￿
;
U
N
￿ . Formulas can be written using the step number
which makes it possible to reason about the current time.
￿ Alma maintains information about various properties of
the formulas in the database, including the derivations of
the formulas, their consequences and the time at which
they were derived; indeed, the entire inferential history
is preserved. This information is available for reasoning
through reserved predicates.
￿ The formulas in the KB have names which allow the user
to assert properties of the formulas and to reason about
these properties. One canfor instance,assert that a partic-
ular formula is to be preferred over another; that its prob-
ability is q; etc.
￿ If
V and
￿
A
V are present in the KB where
V is a literal, this
fact is detected by the contradiction-detection rule. The
W
This formulation comes close, at least intuitively speaking, to
McCarthy’s notion of circumscription with an abnormality predi-
cate; see (McCarthy 1986)
outcomes of a contradiction between formulas
V and
￿
A
V
named
X
Z
Y and
X
9
[ are:
\
– A formula of the form contra(N1, N2, T) is
added to the database where
U is the step number at
which the contradiction has been detected.
– The contradictands and their consequences are “dis-
trusted”sothattheycannotbeusedforfurtherinference
but can be reasoned about.
– Formulas of the form distrusted(N) are added to
the database where
X is the name of a formula that is
distrusted.
One can specify axioms to reason about the contradic-
tion and decide which of the formulas, if any, to reinstate.
Alma provides the reserved predicate
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that purpose.
￿ Some computations that need to be done in the logic may
be more easily, conveniently or efﬁciently done through
procedures. To enablethis, prologprograms can be speci-
ﬁedasinputstoAlma. Thesecanbeinvokedwhenneeded
through the formulas. An alternative for longer running
procedures is Carne (see below).
￿ Almacanoperateinboththeforwardandbackwardchain-
ingmodes. TheusualmodeofoperationforAlmaisinthe
forward direction. Alma also allows one to do backward
chaining to ﬁnd whether some speciﬁc formula is deriv-
able. This isalso done in a step by step fashion, just as for
forward chaining.
Carne: Carne is a process that communicates with Alma
but runsindependently. Themainuse ofCarne isto run non-
logicalcomputationsasynchronousfromAlmasteps. Oneof
its roles is to serve as an input-output interface to Alma. In
this case Carne transforms external input to a form suitable
for addition to the Alma KB and conversely.
Alma formulas can request computations to be done by
Carne by asserting
c
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￿
￿ in the database. This will
trigger the program X in Carne. When the request is sent to
Carne,
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￿ isassertedinAlmatorecordthattheac-
tion has been started. When Carne returns with an answer,
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Carne can add and delete formulas directly in Alma. This
enables external inputs to be added to the Alma database
whenever they become available.
Carne interacts with external processes and with the user
at standard input and output. A KQML parser converts in-
put to a form suitable for further processing in prolog. This
causes a formula to be added to the Alma database. Alma
can thenrequest further processingof the incomingmessage
based on user-deﬁned message interpretation code.
Existing Applications
As indicated above, active logic provides a framework for
reasoning in presence of uncertainties. Some of the applica-
tion areas of active logic are discussed below.
n
Names for formulas play a technical role that we will not fur-
ther detail here.Deadline-Coupled Planning
(Nirkhe et al. 1997) addresses the problem of deadline cou-
pled planning in active logic. Deadline coupled planning in-
volves taking into account the uncertainties that could crop
up in the planning process, while at the same time factoring
in the ever decreasing time to deadline.
Consider for example, an agent planning a strategy to
FedExa hard-copyofa paper before thedeadline. Whilethe
agent is planning the strategy to get to the nearest FedEx lo-
cation, the clock is ticking. Therefore the time he has avail-
able to reach the location before it closes is fast decreasing.
While he is trying to reach the nearest FedEx location, time
is still passing and hence many uncertain events could hap-
pen which could mandate more planning. For instance, a
trafﬁc jam could delay the agent and the nearest FedEx lo-
cationmight close,so that he willhaveto go to anotherloca-
tion which is open later. (This reasoning about the choice of
locations to try next, based on distance and time-to-closing,
is naturally expressible given active logic’s time sensitivity
and representation; further, since the reasoning itself explic-
itlytakesplaceintime,thiscanbeusedtogivepreferencefor
aneasily-computableandworkableplanoveramoreoptimal
possibility which might take too much time to compute.)
The time tracking and observation mechanisms of active
logic render it useful in such applications that deal with un-
certainties while trying to meet a deadline.
Common Sense Reasoning
Active logic ﬁnds applications from fully-decidable default
reasoning to reasoning in the presence of contradictions.
Some examples are listed below (working examples can be
found at
http://www.cs.umd.edu/
o kpurang/alma/demo/demo.html)
SimpleDefaultReasoning GivenfactsBirdsgenerally ﬂy
and Tweety is a bird, active logic can conclude Tweety ﬂies.
Default Reasoning with Preferences In active logic, one
can specify default preferences like “Penguins do not ﬂy is
preferred over Birds generally ﬂy”. Then, if at any instant,
Birds generally ﬂy. Tweety is a bird. Tweety is a penguin.
and Penguins do not ﬂy. are in the database, active logic can
conclude Tweety does not ﬂy.
Maintaining world view An accurate world view cannot
be speciﬁed without keeping track of current facts, because
of the associated uncertainty. Current knowledge can have
gaps (e.g., not knowing what constitutes black holes) or it
mayevenbewrong(e.g.,earthisﬂat). Astimeevolves,facts
might change or cease to be true (e.g., the current president,
coldwar)orevennewfactsmightarise(e.g.,existenceofthe
International Space Station). In order to deal with the ever
changing plethora of facts, active logic has mechanisms to
add, modify or delete facts on the ﬂy.
Reasoning with Contradictions Traditional logics gen-
erate all consequences in the presence of contradictions,
whereasactivelogicusescontradictionstohelpinits reason-
ing process. An agent can believe that Tweety ﬂies until he
gets contrary information through observation or reasoning.
In the presence of contradiction, active logic distrusts both
thecontradictands(Tweety ﬂiesandTweety doesnotﬂy)un-
til it has enough facts to trust one over the other.
Dialog
Active logic has been applied to various dialog problems,
including presupposition failures (Gurney, Perlis, & Purang
1997), cancellation of implicatures (Perlis, Gurney, & Pu-
rang 1996) and dialog management (Perlis et al. 1999). The
following briefs on these issues.
Uncertainty of-
tenariseswhenCooperativePrinciple(Grice1975)isnotob-
servedamong the discourse participants. For instance,when
the speaker provides insufﬁcient amount of information, or
when it is false, irrelevant, ambiguous, vague, or when it
lacks adequateevidence, theaddresseeisuncertainaboutthe
speaker’s intention. Even when the Cooperative Principle
is being followed, uncertainty can just as easily arise; e.g.
if a speaker uses an unknown word or reference, or when
the answer to a question is implicit rather than explicit. In
some cases, conversation orcommunication just stops there,
maybe because the speaker is infelicitous and the addressee
does not wish to participate in conversation. In most cases,
however, theaddresseereasonsabout thespeaker’sintention
andtriesto stayinconversation. Despitethefact thatthereis
apotentialriskofmisunderstandingthatcouldleadtofurther
uncertainty,wetakeadvantageofreasoningwhenitcomesto
resolving uncertainty. In the following subsections, we will
discuss how intelligent reasoning can be effectively woven
into uncertainty resolution in the context of dialog applica-
tions.
Assumption In ambiguous cases, people make assump-
tions based on their previous knowledge. Consider the fol-
lowing example:
“Send the Boston Train to New York.” (1)
In this example, the referent of “the Boston Train” may
be ambiguous: It may mean the train currently at Boston,
or the train going to Boston, or the train which left Boston
this morning (and many other things besides). Furthermore,
there may be more than one candidate for each case, as for
instance, if there is more than one train currently in Boston.
Nevertheless, we candeal withthis ambiguityby makingas-
sumptions based on context.
Relevant context might be the following: The speaker
once used the phrase “the Chicago Train”, and meant the
train currently at Chicago. Hence, we suppose that “the
Boston train” means the train at Boston (although we know
that there are other possibilities); likewise, given several
trains at Boston (e.g. Northstar, Acela, Metroliner) we will
choose one candidate, again with an eye to the overall con-
text of the dialog. For instance, Northstaris leavingsoon for
Cleveland; Acela has mechanical problems. Here we would
be led to assume that Metroliner is the train meant.
It is important to note, however, that this reasoning may
be mistaken: for it could be that the speaker wanted to send
Northstar to New York instead of Cleveland. Any reason-
ingsystemthatemploysassumptionsshouldbeabletorepair
false assumptions (see “Repair” below for details).We have implemented a simpliﬁed form of reasoning into
the Rochester
p
TRAINS (Ferguson et al. 1996) system. In
our version of TRAINS, the system makes the assumption
that phraseslike “the Bostontrain” mean“the train currently
atBoston”,andthenutilizescontextto makeachoiceamong
the trains at Boston. It utilizes context in that it chooses the
ﬁrstcandidate,thechoosingofwhichwillnotcauseacontra-
dictionintheKB. (Forinstance,ifthe sentence“Donot send
Northstar to New York” is in the KB, interpreting “Send the
Boston train to New York” as “Send the Northstar to New
York” will cause a contradiction.)
If the user denies the system’s choice of train, that denial
becomes part of the relevant context, and will be taken into
accountwhenthesystemconsidersthealternativecandidates
in its ongoing efforts to interpret and act on the sentence.
ThusourimplementationofTRAINShasarudimentaryabil-
itytorepairincorrectassumptions. Wearecurrentlyworking
on ways to expand this ability, as for instance by adding the
capacitytoconsiderother interpretationsofphraseslike “the
Boston train”.
Implicature Eachexpressionwe uttercanmeanmorethan
it literally means. Consider the following example:
Q: “Are the roses fresh?”A: “They are in the fridge.” (2)
In this example, the answer “They are in the fridge” ap-
pears to give information about the location of the roses,
ratherthantheirstate(whichiswhatwasaskedabout). How-
ever, it is not hard to see, that, given the location, we are
meant to infer that the roses are, indeed, fresh. One way to
handle implicature is to assign a default interpretation to the
expression. The better way, however, is for the system to be
able to reason about the context, and provide an interpreta-
tion that is most ﬁtting for the context. (Perlis, Gurney, &
Purang 1996) describes an active logic implementation of a
reasoner which correctly concludes that the roses are fresh
from a dialog like example 2.
Meta-Dialogue Whenuncertaintyarises,onewaytoavoid
further uncertainty and potential discourse failure is to ask
for clariﬁcation. In natural language discourse, clariﬁcation
takes place at all times. In the cases discussed, one might
conﬁrm the notion that the roses are fresh: “Yes, but are
they fresh?”. Likewise one might ask: “By Boston Train do
you mean Northstar?” Our version of TRAINS is currently
equippedwithanextremelyrudimentarymeta-dialogability,
triggered only when its own reasoning reaches an impasse
(i.e. when it cannot ﬁnd a candidate which does not cause a
contradiction). In such case it returns a message to the users
which says: Please specify the name of the train.
We are working on a more robust representation of
Question-Answer dialog exchanges that will support a more
impressive range ofmeta-dialog abilities. There are difﬁcult
issuestobefacedeveninthesimplestofcases,however. For
when the system says: “Please specify the train by name” it
looksasthoughthesystemshouldencodeforitselfanexpec-
tationthatsomefutureresponseoftheuserwillberelevantto
that request. But in determiningwhether any given response
is relevant, all the same issues of uncertainty in dialog inter-
pretationassertthemselves. Itseemsthat allofthefollowing
user responsesshouldbe appropriate: “Metroliner”;“Imean
Metroliner”; “Send Metroliner to New York”. However, it
looks like “Sendthe Yankee Clipper to Philadelphia”should
not be understood asrelevant (althoughwe could alwaystell
a story in which it would be relevant, for it could be an im-
plicit cancellation of the original request, perhaps prompt-
ing the question to the user: “Do you still want me to send
the Boston train to New York?”). Likewise, were the user to
haveresponded“SendtheYankeeClippertoNewYork”,this
could be an indication that the Yankee Clipper (which orig-
inated in Boston) was actually the Boston train; and it was
the assumption that “Boston train” meant “train at Boston”
which was incorrect.
The question of determining relevance is a large, difﬁ-
cult, important open area of research. Our approach, as with
other forms of uncertainty,is to modeldeterminationsofrel-
evance with explicit reasoning of the type already described
(although it should be noted that for applications where the
rangeofchoicesiscircumscribedattheoutset,aprobabilistic
approachlooks promising. See, e.g. (Paek& Horvitz1999))
Repair When false assumptions are made, it is important
foranintelligentsystemtobeabletorepairthemistakeaswe
do in naturallanguagediscourse. Inexample2, theanswerer
might add: “but they are not fresh.” In this case, the impli-
cation that the roses are fresh would need to be retracted.
(Perlis, Gurney, & Purang 1996) describes an active logic
implementation which can handle such cancellation of im-
plicature.
Likewise, in the TRAINS example, suppose the system
were to choose the Metroliner as the referent of “the Boston
train”through a courseofreasoning. Itshould beopento the
user to say “No”, and have the system retract its assumption
(and remember the retraction, for it will likely be relevant).
As mentioned, our version of TRAINS has this ability to re-
tract the assertion “Send the Metroliner to New York” and
remember that retraction to help in future interpretations of
userutterances. Itisworthpointingouthoweverthatthesys-
tem has made two assumptions in order to get to its interpre-
tation: ﬁrst,thatthe“Bostontrain”meansthetrainatBoston,
andsecond,thattheMetrolineristherelevanttrainatBoston.
We are workingon reﬁning our representationand use ofthe
ongoing dialog context to make it possible not just to rea-
son about other interpretations of phrases like “the Boston
Train”, but to be able to choose which of these assumptions
to negate in light of the user’s “No.”
Change in meaning
Active logic has been also used to model changes in the
meaning associatedwithterms(Miller1993). Thefollowing
is the kind of problem treated in that work.
Imagine an ongoing conversation in which B initially un-
derstands A’s use of Bush to mean George Walker Bush, the
43rd president of the United States. However, A meant his
father George Herbert Walker Bush, the 41st president. A
then tells B that Bush is the ”read my lips” president. Sup-
posing that B does not know anything about the ”read my
lips” speech that the 41st president made, B will understand
the 43rd president to be the ”read my lips” president. Later,however, when A tells B that Bush is married to Barbara,
B realizes
q his misunderstanding. At this point, B has to re-
associateprevious informationwiththe appropriatereferent;
B then understands that the ”read my lips” president is the
41st president. This is a slightly different sort of repair from
thosementionedin thesectionabove,althoughobviouslyre-
lated.
Potential Applications
Time Sensitive Automated Theorem Prover
Cananautomatedtheoremproverfunction–toitsadvantage
– more like a (human) mathematician? One way in which
this might be possible is via time-sensitivity. A human is
highly aware ofthe passage oftime, and in particularto time
well-spent as opposed to ill-spent.
Thus a mathematician might, after months (or hours, or
even minutes) of pursuing a particular line of investigation,
decide that it is not paying off, and instead try a different
track. Active logic, with its built-in time-sensitivity, pro-
vides a potential mechanism for exploring this possibility.
The obvious advantageis that, although a computer may not
care that it runs a given program for hundreds of years in a
search for a proof, we certainly care and we will want it to
try a different tack long before many years go by.
Thereisanotherlikelypossibleadvantagehere,something
inherent in the active logic framework: it avoids the KR in-
ﬂexibility of most traditional AI systems. In creative ac-
tivities such as mathematical reasoning, often the introduc-
tion of a key new concept, or even an improved (and possi-
bly inequivalent)reformulationofan old concept,can vastly
shorten the argument or even recast it entirely. But AI sys-
temstypicallyarestuckinaﬁxedmeansofrepresentingtheir
knowledge and cannot, for instance use Set(X) to refer to ﬁ-
nite sets at one time, and later to sets that are ﬁnite or in-
ﬁnite. Indeed, such systems cannot easily give up a belief,
and when they do (“belief revision”), it is lost rather than
available for further consideration. This is notto say that ac-
tive logic has a built-in general-purpose concept-formation
mechanism; but it does have the expressive power to rep-
resent and reason with such formations, if they were made
available, perhaps along lines of AM (Lenat 1982; Lenat &
Brown 1984).
Furthermore,asseenearlier, activelogic allowsfor recog-
nition that a given statement is already known, or that it’s
negation is known, or that neither is known, thereby avoid-
ing re-derivationofa theorem. Similarly,if such a purported
human-style-theorem-prover (HSTP) that is allowed to run
in continual mode (rather than started up at a user’s request)
already working on a proof of X, it can respond, if asked
(again)whetherXistrue,thatitisuncertainbutthataproofis
already underway and that it has established such-and-such
lemmas, andso on; or that ithas given up since theconsider-
abletime spenthas notresultedin resultsthat supportfurther
effort.
Interactive Mathematical Companion - IMC
Weenvisionanactive-logic-basedinteractivesystem,which,
inconjunctionwithan appropriatecomputationalmathemat-
ical package (MP) as well as a conventional theorem prover
(TP), can act as a virtualmathematical assistant and/or com-
panion (Benzm¨ uller et al. 1997;Chang & Lee 1973). It may
be used in a variety of modes as illustrated by the following
scenario outline.
A client may wish to use IMC to ask a (mathematical)
question. IMC can try to understand the question on the ba-
sisofitsexistingKBandquitepossiblybeableto answerthe
query. Or it may not understand some of the terms used by
the client and ask the client to explain them. The desired in-
teractionssuchasIMCtryingto clarifythemeaningofterms
can be achieved easily by active logic with its ability of de-
tecting and handling ignorance. Thus a dialog may ensue in
which IMC maytake noteof the new deﬁnitions or factsrel-
evant to the query that the client furnishes in much the same
manner as an interested professional colleague might. After
this preliminary dialog, IMC may ﬁnd that it is unable to an-
swer the question from its (local) KB (even thoughit ‘thinks
itunderstandsthequestion’). At thispoint,IMCmayconsult
the TP to see if TP has an answer to the client’s question. If
TP can respond afﬁrmatively (within the time speciﬁed by
IMC), IMC can capture the answer, convey the same to the
client and also update its KB. In this way IMC is ‘learning’
from the interaction with the client.
If TP is unable to provide the answer, uncertainty prevails
for the client as well as IMC. TP’s inability to provide the
answer may be because one of the two reasons. Either it is
not given sufﬁcient time, or it may just be unable to prove
it from the hypotheses contained in the query. In any case
IMC can tell the client that it does not know the answer to
the question. Uncertainty persists.
The client may then try to pursue some thought of her
own. She may come to a point where it is necessary to com-
pute something (possibly as an intermediate step). She may
choose to ask IMC to do the computation. IMC interprets
client’scommand andformulates thenecessarycomputation
as a request and submits it to the MP. When (and if) it re-
ceives the response from MP it passes it back to the client.
Such an interaction between the client and IMC can con-
tinueindeﬁnitelyuntil theclient decidestoterminateit. IMC
is thus able to mobilize the mathematical resources for the
client.
At each step, during the course of an interaction such as
outlined above, IMC checks any new facts that are submit-
tedtoitby theclient,orthatareresponsesitgathersfromMP
or TP, against its current KB. If the new facts do not directly
contradict the KB, they are recorded as assertions in its KB
alongwiththe(time)stepnumberwhenitwasentered. Ifany
factisinconﬂictwithanyexistingiteminthecurrentKB,the
contradictionisnotedandclient ismadeaware ofthecontra-
dictands. active logic provides a convenient framework in
which IMC can be implemented.
The ability of IMC to keep track of facts as they develop
and to detect contradictions can be put to good use by any
client whomight be trying to check the truthof (or construct
a proof of) a proposition.Continual Computation
AstudentofAIwillsoonﬁndoutthat,almostwithoutexcep-
tion, any interesting problem is NP-hard. When a computer
scientist is confronted with a hard problem, there are several
options to deal with it. One is to simplify the problem, or
identify a simpler subproblem so that it can be solved algo-
rithmicallyandautomated,andleavethehardpartforthehu-
man. Another option isfor the scientist to study theproblem
carefully, derive some heuristics, and hope that they will be
adequatemost of thetime. But noneof these is quite satisfy-
ing: ideally,we would like thecomputer to do asmuch work
for usaspossible,andhopefully,beableto derivetheheuris-
tics by itself. A promising approach toward realizing this
ideal is the notion of continual computation (Horvitz 1997).
The main motivation behind continual computation is to
exploit the idle time of a computation system. As exempli-
ﬁed by usage pattern of desktop computers, workstations,
web-servers, etc of today, most computer systems are under
utilized: in typical employments of these systems, relatively
long spans of inactivity are interrupted with bursts of com-
putation intensive tasks, wherethe systems aretaxed to their
limits. Howcanwemakeuseoftheidletimetohelpimprove
performance during critical time?
Continual computation generalizes the deﬁnition of a
problem to encompass the uncertain stream of challenges
faced over time. One way to analyze this problemis to put it
into the framework of probability and utility, or more gen-
erally, rational decision making(Horvitz 2001). However,
an implicitassumptionof theutility-based work in continual
computationisthatthefutureissomehowpredictable. Butin
many cases, this cannot be expected. For example, for long
term planning, most statistics will probably lose their signif-
icance. Here is a place where logic-based systems with the
capability to derive or discover theorems by its own (e.g.,
Lenat’sAMsystem)canplayacomplementaryrole,inasim-
ilar way where mathematics plays a complementary role to
engineering principles. Just as mathematicians usually do
notrelyon immediaterewardtoguidetheirresearch(yetdis-
cover theoremsof utmost utility), AM can function in a way
independent of the immediate utility of its work.
Moreprecisely, if we adopt logicasour base for computa-
tion and look at problem solving as theorem proving (Bibel
1997),asystemcapableofdiscoveringnewtheoremscanbe-
comeaveryattractivemodelofacontinualcomputationsys-
tem. In such a system, every newly discovered theorem has
thepotentialofsimplifyingtheproofoffuturetheorem; soin
essence, theorem becomes our universal format for caching
the result of precomputation and partial solutions to prob-
lems.
A simplistic embodiment of the model can just be a for-
ward chaining system capable of combining facts in its
database to produce new theorems using modus ponens, for
instance. Such a system is not likely to be very useful, how-
ever, because it will spend most of its time deriving uninter-
esting theorems. So the success of this model of continual
computation will hinge on whether we can ﬁnd meaningful
criteria for the “interestingness” of a theorem. In the classi-
cal AM (Lenat 1982; 1983; Lenat & Brown 1984), the sys-
temrelies largelyon humanto providethejudgmentofinter-
estingness. In a survey of several automated discovery pro-
grams, (Colton & Bundy 1999) identify several properties
of concepts which seem to be relevant to their interesting-
ness, such as novelty, surprisingness, understandability, ex-
istence of models and possibly true conjectures about them.
Although these properties seem plausible, it is not obvious
theyarepreciseenoughto beoperational toguide automated
discovery programs toward signiﬁcant results.
Mathematicalconceptsarecharacterizedbytheirabstract-
ness. In fact, it is unclear whether the interestingness prop-
erty of concepts is even meaningful at such abstract level,
where the concepts are stripped to their bare essentials, san-
itized from any domain speciﬁcity: in real life, our inter-
ests seem always to be tied to our biological existence in
the physical world. When isolated from all real-world in-
terpretations, is there an objective way to tell one theorem
is more “interesting” than another? Although we don’t have
an answerto thisquestion, we havea reasonto beoptimistic:
mathematics has worked so well for us.
Seven Days in the Life of Al To put things into perspec-
tive, we will consider Al, a robot powered by active logic.
Al isan “ofﬁce robot”, whoroamsthe CSofﬁce buildingde-
livering documents, coffee, etc. He was endowed at birth
with the desire to make people happy. We will see how ac-
tivelogicenabledAl todevelopintoanexcellentofﬁcerobot
through his ﬁrst week of work (?).
￿ 1st day: The ﬁrst day Al began his day as the ofﬁce
robot, he was given a tour of the building. Among other
things, he was shown the power outlets scattered around
the building so that he can recharge himself. Not wanting
to overwhelm Al in the new environment, the supervisor
let Al off early.
￿ 2ndday: Themorningwentwell: Aldeliveredeverything
ontarget,makinggooduseofthemapheconstructedfrom
thetourgiven thedaybefore. Butaproblemoccurreddur-
ing the afternoon: Al found himself unable to move! The
problemwassoondiagnosed— itwassimplylow battery.
(Since thinking draws less energy than moving, Al could
still think.) It turned out that although Al knew he needed
power to operate and he could recharge himself to restore
his battery, it had never occurred to him that, “he would
need to reach an outlet before the power went too low for
him to move!” The movement failure triggered Al to de-
rivetheaboveconclusion,butitwastoolate;Alwasstuck,
andcouldnotdelivercoffeeonrequest. Caffeinedeprived
computer scientists are not happy human beings; Al had a
bad day.
￿ 3rd day: Al was bailed out of the predicament by his su-
pervisorat the morning. Havinglearned his lesson, Al de-
cidedto ﬁndan outleta few minutesbefore thebatterygot
too low. Unfortunate for Al, optimal route planning for
robotnavigation is an NP-completeproblem. When Al ﬁ-
nallyfoundanoptimalpathtothenearestpoweroutlet, his
batterylevelwaswellbelowwhat heneeded tomove, and
Al was stuck again. Since there was nothing elsehe could
do,Aldecidedtosurftheweb(throughthenewlyinstalled
wireless network in the building), and came upon an in-teresting article titled“Deadline-CoupledReal-time Plan-
ning”
r (Kraus, Nirkhe, & Perlis 1990).
￿ 4thday: Afterreadingthepaper, Al understoodthatplan-
ning takes time, and decided to quickly pick the outlet in
sight when his battery was low. Unfortunately, the outlet
happenedtobetoofaraway, andAlranoutofpoweragain
before reaching it. Actually, there was a nearer outlet just
around the corner; but since Al used a non-optimal plan-
ningalgorithm,he wasunableto ﬁndit. Again, stuckwith
nothing else to do, Al kicked into the “meditation” mode
where he called the Automated Discovery (AD) module
to draw new conclusions and theorems based on the facts
he accumulated these few days. Al made some interest-
ing discoveries: upon inspecting the history of his obser-
vations and reasonings, Al found that there were only a
few places he frequented; he could actually precompute
theoptimal routesfrom thoseplaces to thenearest outlets.
Al spent all night computing those routes.
￿ 5th day: This morning, Al’s AD module derived an in-
teresting theorem: “if the battery power level is above
97%ofcapacitywhenAlstarts(andnothingbadhappened
along the way), he can reach an outlet before the power is
exhausted.” Finally,Al didn’tget stuck that day. But peo-
ple were not quite happy; Al seemed not very responsive.
Later, it was found that Al spent most of his time around
the outlets recharging himself — since Al’s power level
dropped 3% for every 10 minutes, the theorem above led
himtoconclude thathe neededto go tothe outletevery10
minutes.
￿ 6th day: After Al’s routine introspection before work, it
was revealed to him that his knowledge base was popu-
latedwithmillionsoftheoremssimilartotheonehefound
the day before, but with the power level at 11%, 12%, ...,
andsoon. Infact,thetheoremistruewhenthepowerlevel
is above 10% of capacity. Luckily, there was a meta-rule
inAlknowledgebasesayingthat“atheoremsubsumedby
another was less interesting;” thus all the theorems with
parameter above 10% were discarded. Equippedwith this
newer, more accurate information, Al concluded that he
could get away with recharging every 5 hours. Although
this might not be an optimal rule, it seemed to work well:
Al did his job, and people were happy.
￿ 7th day: That happenedto be Sunday. Nobody was com-
ingtotheofﬁce. Alspenthis daycontemplatingthemean-
ing of life.
We would like to bring to attention several features of ac-
tive logic which helped Al tremendously: time awareness
of active logic enabled Al to realized that optimality is not
necessarilydesirable, especiallywhen there isa deadline ap-
proaching; this realization improved his chances of success.
More fundamentally, the time awareness allows Al to keep
track of changes: the battery level is X now does not imply
that is still true 5 hours later. Active logic’s Now(i) predi-
cate provides a natural and efﬁcient way to deal with that.
The history mechanism in active logic gave Al an opportu-
nityto spot certainpatternin his pastbehavior, whichhelped
him improve his future behavior. The expressiveness of ac-
tive logic made it possible to store the meta-rules about in-
terestingness of theorems, which gave Al a good “taste” in
evaluating them. Finally, because of the uniformity of the
logic-basedsystem, precomputationisseamlesslyintegrated
into goal based problem solving through the forward- and
backward-chaining mechanisms of active logic.
The so called No Free Lunch Theorem (Wolpert &
Macready 1997) states that “all algorithms that search for
an extremum of a cost function perform exactly the same,
when averaged over all possible cost functions.” In other
words, without domain speciﬁc structural assumptions of
the problem, no algorithm can be expected to perform bet-
ter on average than simple blind search. This result ap-
pears to be a cause for pessimism for researchers hoping
to devise domain-independent methods to improve problem
solving performance. But on the other hand, this theorem
also provides compelling reasonfor embracingthe notion of
continual computation, which can be seen as a way to ex-
ploit domain dependent information in a domain indepen-
dent way. However, to take advantage of continual compu-
tation, we cannotavoid the issueofinterestingness. Interest-
ingnesstouchesontheultimateuncertainty: whattodonext?
Although utility theory has its place, we argued that there
are aspects of interestingnessnot susceptible to utility based
analysis. We believe that a forward and backward chaining
capablelogicsystemsuchasactivelogic,withitsexpressive-
ness,time sensitivity, and reﬂective ability to reason about
theorems, proofs and derivations, is well-positioned to take
advantage of the opportunity offered by continual computa-
tion and explore the possibilitiesof interestingness.
Importing Intelligence Into Computation
In this paper we hope to have supported the view that (ex-
plicit, time-sensitive, and ﬂexible) reasoning can be advan-
tageous wherever there is uncertainty. The underlying ar-
chitecture can be thought of as (one or more) procedural al-
gorithms with a suitably attached reasoning component so
the (system of interacting) algorithms becomes capable of
self-monitoring in real time. The reasoning component af-
fords certain protections such as recognizing and repairing
errors, informed guiding of strategies, and incorporation of
new concepts and terminologies.
In our view, reasoning should apply almost across the
board, not only to AI programs, or to automated theorem-
provers, but also, for example, to operating systems. Imag-
ine an OS that had an attached active logic. Such an OS-
Alma pair not only could gather statistics on its ongoing
behavior (this is not new) but could infer and initiate real-
time alterations to its behavior as indicated by the circum-
stances. We envision such an application as largely default-
powered, along the line of error-diagnosis tools such as
(deKleer 1986). But an active logic version has the addi-
tional virtues of accepting dynamically changing observa-
tions,andofhavingagenuinereal-timedefaultcapabilityvia
its introspective lookup interpretation of ignorance.Acknowledgments
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